Browsing by Author "De Brasi, Leandro"

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    Anxiety as a Positive Epistemic Emotion in Politics
    (2021) De Brasi, Leandro; Guglielmetti, Florencia; Rosati, Antonia
    People suffer from a variety of cognitive shortcomings when forming and updating their political beliefs. Three pervasive shortcomings are confirmation bias, disconfirmation bias, and motivated reasoning. The emotional state of anxiety can help us overcome these biases given the open-minded, information-rich, reflective deliberation with diverse people it may promote-although mass and social media may hinder this type of deliberation.
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    Socratic Ignorance, Intellectual Humility and Intellectual Autonomy
    (2023) Boeri, Marcelo D.; De Brasi, Leandro; Pontifica Universidad Católica de Chile; Universidad de La Frontera
    A recent stream of epistemology gives special relevance to ignorance within the framework of an epistemological theory. Indeed, some want to give a significant role to ignorance in epistemological theorizing. In this paper, we argue that a particular sort of ignorance, which involves recognition of the fact that one is ignorant, is central to the acquisition of knowledge given the epistemic structure of society. It is clear, we hold, that Socrates realized the relevance of what we call ‘Socratic ignorance’ in the acquisition of knowledge and was aware of the division of epistemic and cognitive labor that we find in our society. We shall explain the way we understand this Socratic ignorance, as opposed to what we will call ‘stubborn ignorance’ and the role this ignorance of Socratic overtones and related character traits can play in the acquisition of knowledge from others and with others.
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    The Ancient Sceptic Attitude and Disagreement
    (2023) Boeri, Marcelo D.; De Brasi, Leandro
    It is argued that a philosophical “sceptic attitude”, found originally in the Socratic approach and arguably in the Pyrrhonist’s treatment of disagreement, should be taken to be an epistemically positive attitude in the sense that it fosters a serious philosophical examination of what is taken to be true, without entailing the radical scepticism often associated with it. We argue that if the two sides of a disagreement are equivalent (at that moment, given the evidence available), it doesn’t require one to consider the disagreement as undecidable without qualification and so to suspend judgment indefinitely. If this is so, we claim, the Pyrrhonian disagreement-based position will be significantly restricted as a form of scepticism and should instead be seen as promoting an epistemically propitious sceptic attitude.