Browsing by Author "Molina Castro, Juan David"

Now showing 1 - 8 of 8
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    A Principal-Agent Approach to Transmission Expansion-Part I: Regulatory Framework
    (IEEE, 2013) Molina Castro, Juan David; Contreras, J.; Rudnick van de Wyngard, Hugh
    Different regulatory frameworks have implemented competitive mechanisms to increase efficiency in transmission, a natural monopoly. Conflicts of interest and hidden costs make necessary to define methods to obtain an appropriate valuation of new transmission assets. This paper is the first one of a two-paper series and presents the fundamentals of transmission project valuation and cost allocation. We show the fundamentals of non-cooperative game theory, different concepts of game equilibria (Nash, Stackelberg, and Berge), and solutions to the bilateral negotiation problem (Nash bargaining solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Rubinstein). In addition, the design of mechanisms, the information revelation principles, and incentive compatibility issues are described. We propose a model composed of three elements: valuation of a transmission project based on a linear contract, a principal-agent model to determine the optimal effort of an agent developing the transmission project, and the optimal bilateral negotiation of right-of-way costs. We define a method to evaluate the offers to build a transmission line project as a function of the number of agents bidding for it. The value of the project is a function of both the incentives and the valuation of the right-of-way costs. In part two of this series, we present two case studies: the IEEE 24-bus RTS and the Sistema Interconectado Central (SIC) in Chile, where we apply the methodology to a real network.
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    A Principal-Agent Approach to Transmission Expansion-Part II: Case Studies
    (IEEE, 2013) Molina Castro, Juan David; Contreras, J.; Rudnick van de Wyngard, Hugh
    This paper is the second of a two-paper series and presents a model to assess and promote investment projects defined in a plan of expansion of the transmission. We propose a model that consists of three main elements: valuation of a project based on the design of a linear contract, a principal-agent model to assess the optimal effort of an agent, and the right-of-way negotiating cost. We also define a model to evaluate bids by the agents. The value of the project depends on the number of competitors, the incentives to invest, and the right-of-way costs. The right-of-way cost is approached from the perspective of a bilateral bargaining problem.
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    Approaches to transmission planning: A transmission expansion game
    (IEEE, 2012) Molina Castro, Juan David; Contreras, Javier; Rudnick Van de Wyngard, Hugh
    Defining and making decisions about network investments has become a hard task in a competitive environment. This work defines a methodology to look for expansion alternatives in a transmission system. We propose a Transmission Expansion Game model that consists of four main elements: i) generating transmission expansion plan scenarios, ii) valuation of a project based on the design of a linear contract, bargaining solutions and hidden actions, iii) optimal value of a risky investor's portfolio made up of several projects, and iv) transmission cost allocation with wind energy assets. The results obtained show that the model developed is efficient to solve the combinatorial problem. A principal-agent model obtains the real costs of the bidders and creates incentives for disclosure of information. The private optimal portfolio and bargaining for allocation cost gives evidence for the central planner to adjust the project assignment process and to carry out the proposed expansion plan efficiently. To test the methodology we analyze the Chilean Central Interconnected System.
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    Mecanismos para la inversión y remuneración de la transmisión de energía eléctrica
    (2012) Molina Castro, Juan David; Rudnick Van de Wyngard, Henry; Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Escuela de Ingeniería
    La evolución del mercado de energía y la creciente participación de los agentes en el negocio de la transmisión de energía han traído consigo una mayor complejidad para definir qué expandir en un sistema de transmisión y cómo decidir un plan de expansión. Las metodologías de expansión se sostienen bajo principios de cooperación y bajo este principio se han propuesto varias alternativas para su desarrollo. Sin, embargo, los agentes participantes en la expansión de la transmisión son racionales y como tal maximizan su utilidad. Esto hace necesario evaluar mecanismos de acoplamiento entre conceptos económicos y técnicos con la finalidad de brindar soluciones claras y transparentes para el desarrollo del mercado eléctrico. El objetivo de la investigación es diseñar un mecanismo que incentive la expansión de la transmisión considerando la maximización del beneficio social, la estructura del mercado y el comportamiento de los agentes. Se propone una metodología de expansión de la transmisión, un juego, que consta de cuatro elementos principales: i) la generación de alternativas de planes de expansión de la transmisión, ii) la valoración de proyectos con base en el diseño de contrato lineales, soluciones de negociación y el modelo de principal-agente, iii) el valor óptimo de un portafolio de inversión desde la perspectiva de un inversionista privado y iv) la aceptabilidad y asignación de costo de los proyectos de expansión.
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    Renewable energy integration: Mechanism for investment on bulk power transmission
    (IEEE, 2010) Molina Castro, Juan David; Rudnick Van de Wyngard, Hugh
    Transmission has established itself as a natural monopoly, and as such, the prices and remaining access and operating conditions of the transmission system have been regulated. In the regulations existing before the electric sector reform there was a single planner that determined the generation and transmission expansion. However, each time more mechanisms have been implemented that have allowed individualizing the agents of interest and as such, uncoupling planning and investment from the power plants and grids. This has brought a problem based on the optimal and timely investment on grids, mainly when power injection is considered with high uncertainty, as it usually happens with renewable energies. This work faces this problem considering a grid game under a non-cooperative environment, which is solved under the concepts of the Nash-Bayesian equilibrium. Two case studies are implemented, a bilateral and a coordination scenario for a reduced grid of the Chilean interconnected system. The Bayesian mechanisms describe the various interests of the agents, which tend to be more conflictive, hence increasing the complexity of the transmission expansion game. In coordinated environments it becomes necessary to create incentives for a timely investment in the grid. In grid modeling there are two core aspects to be considered from the strategic viewpoint. The first one is the costs and benefits model. They allow determining how the grid is formed based on individual incentives to maintain or not maintaining its links. The second aspect is the one that determines or forecasts how the individual incentives are translated into the formation of the grid. It is concluded that without a correct design of incentives to expand the grid, transmission will become a constraint for the optimal participation of renewable energies.
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    Technological impact of non-conventional renewable energy in the Chilean electricity system
    (IEEE, 2010) Molina Castro, Juan David; Martinez Aranza, Victor Julio; Rudnick Van de Wyngard, Hugh
    Renewable energy has had a steady growth in power systems worldwide. The high uncertainty about what type of renewable technology meets technical and economic variables of the energy markets and what could be the participation in the energy matrix are important long term energy planning challenges that need to be identified and evaluated. This work assesses different scenarios of future development of the Chilean electricity matrix and the technological contribution of renewables. They are formulated within the Chilean Central Interconnected System and determine the evolution of technological diversity variables, costs, CO2 emissions and energy injection. The scenarios illustrate the need to strengthen the transmission system and the importance of improving and / or incorporating mechanisms to reduce dependence on fossil fuels and the maximization of renewable resources in Chile. Future work will establish the impact of intermittent renewable technologies on power system operation.
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    Transmission expansion investment: Cooperative or non-cooperative game?
    (IEEE, 2010) Molina Castro, Juan David; Rudnick Van de Wyngard, Hugh
    The debate on which is the best incentive for transmission expansion is still active. Discussions center on economic mechanisms based on game theory to expand transmission. There is a mix of experiences and they vary in function of the level of interaction of market agents. Identifying the agents' strategies will allow a better understanding of the market's dynamics. This article assesses regulatory incentives based on the market for transmission expansion. Game theory fundamentals are developed, namely, the cooperative and non-cooperative games. Four base cases of a bi-nodal model were implemented. It is claimed that given the individual interests (egotistical) and grid characteristics (non-stored energy, circulating flows and variables), the transmission expansion fits better to a non-cooperative model. An alternative analysis is the design of Bayesian mechanisms.
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    Transmission expansion plan: Ordinal and metaheuristic multiobjective optimization
    (IEEE, 2011) Molina Castro, Juan David; Rudnick Van de Wyngard, Hugh
    Electric energy transmission is essential for the operation of competitive energy markets. Transmission expansion planning has been defined as a complex combinatorial optimization problem. This work puts forward a description of the solution techniques and alternatives to implement the transmission system's expansion. A model that considers Multi-objective Optimization - MOO - criteria is proposed under the concepts of Tabu Search - TS - Ordinal Optimization - OO - and Pareto optimality. The model proposed generates expansion plans under the Pareto optimality approach. It shows acceptable solutions under robustness and algorithmic speed criteria. The results obtained in the test systems show that the model developed is effective to find the solution for the combinatorial problem. Multi-objective optimization defines a set of feasible solutions that establishes expansion plans scenarios.