Browsing by Author "Rodriguez Sickert, Carlos"

Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
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    Endogenous group reputation - A formal model
    (CONSEJO SUPERIOR INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS-CSIC, 2007) Rodriguez Sickert, Carlos; Valenzuela Carvallo, Eduardo
    When investment in individual reputation cannot solve contract incompleteness, group reputation becomes crucial to achieve social cooperation. In this article we develop a formal model in which the link between social pressure, group reputation formation and between groups trust is studied. Specifically, we model a transaction which involves trust as an asymmetric game. Additionally, we consider the operation of community-enforced sanctions within the group whose trustworthiness is required. We show that for a proportion high enough of honourable agents willing to sanction non-honourable peers, the optimal strategy of a selfish rational agent is to honour trust when placed in him and, therefore, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is one in which inter-group trust emerges. The required proportion of sanctioning agents depends negatively on the efficacy of the sanctioning technology and positively on the size of the opportunistic incentives faced by the agents whose trustworthiness is required. Even if the deterrence effect of social pressure is not strong enough, trust can emerge if the potential benefits from cooperation compensate the eventual harm associated with abused trust.
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    Institutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment
    (ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV, 2008) Rodriguez Sickert, Carlos; Guzman, Ricardo Andres; Cardenas, Juan Camilo
    We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting Our model to experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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    Navigating transformations in governance of Chilean marine coastal resources
    (NATL ACAD SCIENCES, 2010) Gelcich, Stefan; Hughes, Terry P.; Olsson, Per; Folke, Carl; Defeo, Omar; Fernandez, Miriam; Foale, Simon; Gunderson, Lance H.; Rodriguez Sickert, Carlos; Scheffer, Marten; Steneck, Robert S.; Castilla, Juan C.
    Marine ecosystems are in decline. New transformational changes in governance are urgently required to cope with overfishing, pollution, global changes, and other drivers of degradation. Here we explore social, political, and ecological aspects of a transformation in governance of Chile's coastal marine resources, from 1980 to today. Critical elements in the initial preparatory phase of the transformation were (i) recognition of the depletion of resource stocks, (ii) scientific knowledge on the ecology and resilience of targeted species and their role in ecosystem dynamics, and (iii) demonstration-scale experimental trials, building on smaller-scale scientific experiments, which identified new management pathways. The trials improved cooperation among scientists and fishers, integrating knowledge and establishing trust. Political turbulence and resource stock collapse provided a window of opportunity that triggered the transformation, supported by new enabling legislation. Essential elements to navigate this transformation were the ability to network knowledge from the local level to influence the decision-making processes at the national level, and a preexisting social network of fishers that provided political leverage through a national confederation of artisanal fishing collectives. The resultant governance scheme includes a revolutionary national system of marine tenure that allocates user rights and responsibilities to fisher collectives. Although fine tuning is necessary to build resilience of this new regime, this transformation has improved the sustainability of the interconnected social-ecological system. Our analysis of how this transformation unfolded provides insights into how the Chilean system could be further developed and identifies generalized pathways for improved governance of marine resources around the world.
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    When in Rome, do as the Romans do: the coevolution of altruistic punishment, conformist learning, and cooperation
    (ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2007) Guzman, Ricardo Andres; Rodriguez Sickert, Carlos; Rowthorn, Robert
    We model the coevolution of behavioral strategies and social learning rules in the context of a cooperative dilemma, a situation in which individuals must decide whether or not to subordinate their own interests to those of the group. There are two learning rules in our model, conformism and payoff-dependent imitation, which evolve by natural selection, and three behavioral strategies, cooperate, defect, and cooperate, plus punish defectors, which evolve under the influence of the prevailing learning rules. Group and individual level selective pressures drive evolution.