Expropriation : A Mechanism Design Approach.

dc.contributor.advisorFigueroa González, Nicolás Andrés
dc.contributor.advisorMontero Ayala, Juan Pablo
dc.contributor.authorJiménez Gimpel, Vicente Antonio
dc.contributor.otherPontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-13T18:24:41Z
dc.date.available2020-03-13T18:24:41Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.descriptionTesis (Magíster en Economía)--Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2020
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the problem of an agent that needs to buy a fixed amount of units from multiple firms with private information regarding their costs of production. We characterize the optimal —cost minimizing— mechanism using the classical mechanism design approach and it turns out to be difficult to implement in practice. Consequently, we present two alternatives of a sequential nature that are more easily implementable: the familiar sequential posted prices scheme and a novel “sequentially optimal” mechanism. We characterize these mechanisms and show through numerical analysis that the latter tends to closely approximate the expected cost of the optimal mechanism, while the former performs much worse. The results have natural applications to several issues faced by a government, for example, the problem of buying back (“expropriating”) pollution permits in order to meet an international environmental agreement.
dc.format.extent36 páginas
dc.identifier.doi10.7764/tesisUC/ECO/28522
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.7764/tesisUC/ECO/28522
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/28522
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido completo
dc.rightsacceso abierto
dc.subject.ddc338.514
dc.subject.deweyEconomíaes_ES
dc.subject.otherAnálisis de costos - Modelos matemáticos.es_ES
dc.titleExpropriation : A Mechanism Design Approach.es_ES
dc.typetesis de maestría
sipa.codpersvinculados87534
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