Renewable energy integration: Mechanism for investment on bulk power transmission

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorMolina Castro, Juan David
dc.contributor.authorRudnick Van de Wyngard, Hugh
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-16T13:00:23Z
dc.date.available2022-05-16T13:00:23Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.description.abstractTransmission has established itself as a natural monopoly, and as such, the prices and remaining access and operating conditions of the transmission system have been regulated. In the regulations existing before the electric sector reform there was a single planner that determined the generation and transmission expansion. However, each time more mechanisms have been implemented that have allowed individualizing the agents of interest and as such, uncoupling planning and investment from the power plants and grids. This has brought a problem based on the optimal and timely investment on grids, mainly when power injection is considered with high uncertainty, as it usually happens with renewable energies. This work faces this problem considering a grid game under a non-cooperative environment, which is solved under the concepts of the Nash-Bayesian equilibrium. Two case studies are implemented, a bilateral and a coordination scenario for a reduced grid of the Chilean interconnected system. The Bayesian mechanisms describe the various interests of the agents, which tend to be more conflictive, hence increasing the complexity of the transmission expansion game. In coordinated environments it becomes necessary to create incentives for a timely investment in the grid. In grid modeling there are two core aspects to be considered from the strategic viewpoint. The first one is the costs and benefits model. They allow determining how the grid is formed based on individual incentives to maintain or not maintaining its links. The second aspect is the one that determines or forecasts how the individual incentives are translated into the formation of the grid. It is concluded that without a correct design of incentives to expand the grid, transmission will become a constraint for the optimal participation of renewable energies.
dc.fuente.origenIEEE
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/POWERCON.2010.5666040
dc.identifier.eisbn9781424459407
dc.identifier.isbn9781424459384
dc.identifier.urihttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=5666040
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/POWERCON.2010.5666040
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/63906
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Molina Castro, Juan David ; S/I ; 181795
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Rudnick, Hugh ; S/I ; 99167
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido parcial
dc.publisherIEEE
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Conference on Power System Technology (2010 : Zhejiang, China)
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectNon-cooperative game
dc.subjectBayesian mechanism
dc.subjectTransmission expansion
dc.subjectRenewable energy integration
dc.titleRenewable energy integration: Mechanism for investment on bulk power transmissiones_ES
dc.typecomunicación de congreso
sipa.codpersvinculados181795
sipa.codpersvinculados99167
Files
Collections
Artículos de conferencia