When in Rome, do as the Romans do: the coevolution of altruistic punishment, conformist learning, and cooperation

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dc.contributor.authorGuzman, Ricardo Andres
dc.contributor.authorRodriguez Sickert, Carlos
dc.contributor.authorRowthorn, Robert
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-10T12:10:59Z
dc.date.available2024-01-10T12:10:59Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.description.abstractWe model the coevolution of behavioral strategies and social learning rules in the context of a cooperative dilemma, a situation in which individuals must decide whether or not to subordinate their own interests to those of the group. There are two learning rules in our model, conformism and payoff-dependent imitation, which evolve by natural selection, and three behavioral strategies, cooperate, defect, and cooperate, plus punish defectors, which evolve under the influence of the prevailing learning rules. Group and individual level selective pressures drive evolution.
dc.description.abstractWe also simulate our model for conditions that approximate those in which early hominids lived. We find that conformism can evolve when the only problem that individuals face is a cooperative dilemma, in which prosocial behavior is always costly to the individual. Furthermore, the presence of conformists dramatically increases the group size for which cooperation can be sustained. The results of our model are robust: they hold even when migration rates are high, and when conflict among groups is infrequent. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital22-03-2024
dc.format.extent6 páginas
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.08.002
dc.identifier.eissn1879-0607
dc.identifier.issn1090-5138
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.08.002
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/76622
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000244735200005
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía;Guzmán R;S/I;9735
dc.information.autorucEscuela de Administración;Rodríguez-Sickert C;S/I;96511
dc.issue.numero2
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesocontenido parcial
dc.pagina.final117
dc.pagina.inicio112
dc.publisherELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
dc.revistaEVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectevolution of behavior
dc.subjectsocial learning
dc.subjectcooperation
dc.subjectconformism
dc.subjectaltruistic punishment
dc.subjectEVOLUTION
dc.subjectTRANSMISSION
dc.subject.ods10 Reduced Inequality
dc.subject.odspa10 Reducción de las desigualdades
dc.titleWhen in Rome, do as the Romans do: the coevolution of altruistic punishment, conformist learning, and cooperation
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen28
sipa.codpersvinculados9735
sipa.codpersvinculados96511
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadCarga SIPA;09-01-2024
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