Fiscal Origins of Subnational Democracy: Evidence from Argentina

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dc.catalogadorgjm
dc.contributor.authorDíaz Rioseco, Diego
dc.contributor.authorAlberti Chesta, Carla Andrea
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-30T13:04:23Z
dc.date.available2023-01-30T13:04:23Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.date.updated2023-01-13T03:23:57Z
dc.description.abstractSubnational governments are generally funded by fiscal rents, that is, transfers of centrally levied taxes. Existing literature concurs that fiscal federalism breeds rentierism and, consequently, hinders subnational democracy. However, in Argentina, fiscal rents do not always lead to low provincial contestation. Building on research on oil-based rentierism and fiscal federalism, we argue that this variation results from the provincial fiscal institutions that distribute central-government transfers from the province to municipalities. Specifically, we claim that as provincial fiscal institutions decentralize fiscal rents from the province to municipalities, they empower mayors to challenge governors. Conversely, as these institutions centralize rents at the province, they empower governors and weaken opposition from below. Using panel data and a comparison between Tierra del Fuego and Santa Cruz—the provinces that receive the largest fiscal transfers—we show that the effect of fiscal rents on incumbent party advantage decreases and eventually disappears as institutions become province-decentralizing.
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital2023-01-30
dc.fuente.origenSIPA
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/00323292221137192
dc.identifier.urihttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00323292221137192
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/66450
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000890836200001
dc.information.autorucInstituto de ciencia política; Díaz Rioseco, Diego; 0000-0003-3045-3759; 151353
dc.information.autorucInstituto de ciencia política; Alberti Chesta, Carla Andrea; 0000-0002-0679-4716; 141800
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido parcial
dc.revistaPolitics & Society
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectSubnational democracy
dc.subjectFiscal federalism
dc.subjectRentierism
dc.subjectDecentralization
dc.subjectMunicipalities
dc.subject.ods10 Reduced inequalities
dc.subject.odspa10 Reducción de las desigualdades
dc.titleFiscal Origins of Subnational Democracy: Evidence from Argentina
dc.typeartículo
sipa.codpersvinculados151353
sipa.codpersvinculados141800
sipa.indexWOS
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