Optimal pricing of flights and passengers at congested airports and the efficiency of atomistic charges

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dc.catalogadorvzp
dc.contributor.authorSilva Montalva, Hugo Emilio
dc.contributor.authorVerhoef, Erik T.
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-27T16:20:10Z
dc.date.available2023-09-27T16:20:10Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates and compares airport pricing policies under various types of competition, considering both per-passenger and per-flight charges at congested airports. We show that an airport requires both pricing instruments to achieve the first-best outcome, and we distinguish their role by showing that congestion externalities need to be addressed through per-flight tolls whereas the inefficiency caused by airlines' market power exertion must be corrected with per-passenger subsidies. We also show that Bertrand competition with differentiated products, a type of behavior recently pointed out by the empirical literature as pertinent, has policy implications that diverge from analyses that assume Cournot competition. The welfare gains and congestion reductions of congestion pricing would be higher than what has been advanced before; the degree of self-financing of airport infrastructure under optimal pricing would be increased and may approach exact self-financing; and the implied differentiation of charges between (asymmetric) airlines would be significantly smaller, presumably enhancing the political feasibility of welfare maximizing congestion pricing, as the potential distributional concerns would be decreased. Finally, we numerically analyze second-best policies, and find that atomistic pricing may offer a relatively attractive alternative to first-best congestion pricing. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.description.funderOtro
dc.description.funderERC Advanced Grant
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital2023-09-27
dc.format.extent13 páginas
dc.fuente.origenHistorial Académico
dc.identifier.citationSilva, H.E., Verhoef, E.T.. Optimal pricing of flights and passengers at congested airports and the efficiency of atomistic charges. Journal Of Public Economics. 2013;106:1-13.
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jpub
dc.identifier.issn0047-2727
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.06.007
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/74717
dc.information.autorucEconomía y Administración;Silva, H.E.;S/I;1020528
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido parcial
dc.pagina.final13
dc.pagina.inicio1
dc.revistaJournal of Public Economics
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectAirport pricing
dc.subjectCongestion internalization
dc.subjectAirline conduct
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.deweyEconomíaes_ES
dc.titleOptimal pricing of flights and passengers at congested airports and the efficiency of atomistic charges
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen106
sipa.codpersvinculados1020528
sipa.indexISI-2000-2002-2004-2018-2020
sipa.indexScopus-2013-2018
sipa.trazabilidadHistorial Académico;09-07-2021
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