A dynamic simulation model to support reduction in illegal trade within legal wildlife markets

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dc.contributor.authorOyanedel, Rodrigo
dc.contributor.authorGelcich, Stefan
dc.contributor.authorMathieu, Emile
dc.contributor.authorMilner-Gulland, E. J.
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T22:01:44Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T22:01:44Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.description.abstractSustainable wildlife trade is critical for biodiversity conservation, livelihoods, and food security. Regulatory frameworks are needed to secure these diverse benefits of sustainable wildlife trade. However, regulations limiting trade can backfire, sparking illegal trade if demand is not met by legal trade alone. Assessing how regulations affect wildlife market participants' incentives is key to controlling illegal trade. Although much research has assessed how incentives at both the harvester and consumer ends of markets are affected by regulations, little has been done to understand the incentives of traders (i.e., intermediaries). We built a dynamic simulation model to support reduction in illegal wildlife trade within legal markets by focusing on incentives traders face to trade legal or illegal products. We used an Approximate Bayesian Computation approach to infer illegal trading dynamics and parameters that might be unknown (e.g., price of illegal products). We showcased the utility of the approach with a small-scale fishery case study in Chile, where we disentangled within-year dynamics of legal and illegal trading and found that the majority (similar to 77%) of traded fish is illegal. We utilized the model to assess the effect of policy interventions to improve the fishery's sustainability and explore the trade-offs between ecological, economic, and social goals. Scenario simulations showed that even significant increases (over 200%) in parameters proxying for policy interventions enabled only moderate improvements in ecological and social sustainability of the fishery at substantial economic cost. These results expose how unbalanced trader incentives are toward trading illegal over legal products in this fishery. Our model provides a novel tool for promoting sustainable wildlife trade in data-limited settings, which explicitly considers traders as critical players in wildlife markets. Sustainable wildlife trade requires incentivizing legal over illegal wildlife trade and consideration of the social, ecological, and economic impacts of interventions.
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/cobi.13814
dc.identifier.eissn1523-1739
dc.identifier.issn0888-8892
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.13814
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/93880
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000704608800001
dc.issue.numero2
dc.language.isoen
dc.revistaConservation biology
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectBayesian approach
dc.subjectenforcement
dc.subjectfisheries
dc.subjectintermediaries
dc.subjectpredictive modeling
dc.subjectsupply-driven markets
dc.subjectsustainability
dc.subjectaplicacion
dc.subjectenfoque Bayesiano
dc.subjectintermediarios
dc.subjectmercados impulsados por la oferta
dc.subjectmodelo predictivo
dc.subjectpesquerias
dc.subjectsustentabilidad
dc.subject.ods13 Climate Action
dc.subject.ods02 Zero Hunger
dc.subject.ods01 No Poverty
dc.subject.ods15 Life on Land
dc.subject.odspa13 Acción por el clima
dc.subject.odspa02 Hambre cero
dc.subject.odspa01 Fin de la pobreza
dc.subject.odspa15 Vida de ecosistemas terrestres
dc.titleA dynamic simulation model to support reduction in illegal trade within legal wildlife markets
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen36
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2025-01-12
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