Stability and equilibrium selection in a link formation game

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dc.contributor.authorHarrison, Rodrigo
dc.contributor.authorMunoz, Roberto
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-21T01:04:58Z
dc.date.available2025-01-21T01:04:58Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we study a static link formation game under consent that has multiple Nash equilibria. In the literature, the use of coalitional refinements has been the standard approach to select among equilibria. Alternatively, based on the Global Games theory, a non cooperative equilibrium selection approach is proposed, so as to select those Nash equilibria that are robust to the introduction of incomplete information. Interestingly, the equilibrium selected is unique and it is in conflict with those predicted by the commonly used coalitional refinements. Furthermore, a conflict is found between stability and efficiency even when no such conflict exists with the coalitional refinements.
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00199-007-0309-5
dc.identifier.issn0938-2259
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0309-5
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/95761
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000258654700008
dc.issue.numero2
dc.language.isoen
dc.pagina.final345
dc.pagina.inicio335
dc.revistaEconomic theory
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectglobal games
dc.subjectnetworks
dc.subjectequilibrium selection
dc.subject.ods10 Reduced Inequality
dc.subject.odspa10 Reducción de las desigualdades
dc.titleStability and equilibrium selection in a link formation game
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen37
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2025-01-12
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