A Principal-Agent Approach to Transmission Expansion-Part I: Regulatory Framework

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dc.contributor.authorMolina Castro, Juan David
dc.contributor.authorContreras, J.
dc.contributor.authorRudnick van de Wyngard, Hugh
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-18T14:04:50Z
dc.date.available2022-05-18T14:04:50Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractDifferent regulatory frameworks have implemented competitive mechanisms to increase efficiency in transmission, a natural monopoly. Conflicts of interest and hidden costs make necessary to define methods to obtain an appropriate valuation of new transmission assets. This paper is the first one of a two-paper series and presents the fundamentals of transmission project valuation and cost allocation. We show the fundamentals of non-cooperative game theory, different concepts of game equilibria (Nash, Stackelberg, and Berge), and solutions to the bilateral negotiation problem (Nash bargaining solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Rubinstein). In addition, the design of mechanisms, the information revelation principles, and incentive compatibility issues are described. We propose a model composed of three elements: valuation of a transmission project based on a linear contract, a principal-agent model to determine the optimal effort of an agent developing the transmission project, and the optimal bilateral negotiation of right-of-way costs. We define a method to evaluate the offers to build a transmission line project as a function of the number of agents bidding for it. The value of the project is a function of both the incentives and the valuation of the right-of-way costs. In part two of this series, we present two case studies: the IEEE 24-bus RTS and the Sistema Interconectado Central (SIC) in Chile, where we apply the methodology to a real network.
dc.fuente.origenIEEE
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TPWRS.2012.2201179
dc.identifier.eissn1558-0679
dc.identifier.issn0885-8950
dc.identifier.urihttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=6231709
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2012.2201179
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/64115
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000313965700027
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Molina Castro, Juan David ; S/I ; 181795
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Rudnick van de Wyngard, Hugh ; S/I ; 99168
dc.issue.numero1
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido parcial
dc.pagina.final263
dc.pagina.inicio253
dc.publisherIEEE
dc.revistaIEEE Transactions on Power Systems
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectGames
dc.subjectContracts
dc.subjectCost accounting
dc.subjectGame theory
dc.subjectPlanning
dc.subjectResource management
dc.subjectInvestments
dc.subject.ods07 Affordable and clean energy
dc.subject.odspa07 Energía asequible y no contaminante
dc.titleA Principal-Agent Approach to Transmission Expansion-Part I: Regulatory Frameworkes_ES
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen28
sipa.codpersvinculados181795
sipa.codpersvinculados99167
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