A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object

dc.contributor.authorAlvarado Marambio, José Tomás
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T16:56:21Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T16:56:21Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.date.updated2022-08-23T20:50:38Z
dc.description.abstractSuppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.
dc.fuente.origenSIPA
dc.identifier.doi10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N4.JA
dc.identifier.issn0100-6045
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.scielo.br/j/man/a/H5nVssnCZCJVZwNbMd8WZ3H/?lang=en#
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/65318
dc.information.autorucInstituto de filosofía ; Alvarado Marambio, José Tomás ; 0000-0003-2324-8458 ; 90223
dc.issue.numero4
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido completo
dc.pagina.final417
dc.pagina.inicio374
dc.revistaManuscrito, Revista Internacional de Filosofía
dc.rightsacceso abierto
dc.subjectCosmological Argument
dc.subjectOntological Argument
dc.subjectCausation
dc.subjectModality
dc.titleA modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen44
sipa.codpersvinculados90223
sipa.indexScopus
sipa.indexWOS
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