How do different payment schemes to operators affect public transport concessions? A microeconomic model

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dc.contributor.authorPablo Sepulveda, Juan
dc.contributor.authorGalilea, Patricia
dc.contributor.otherCEDEUS (Chile)
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-10T13:49:07Z
dc.date.available2024-01-10T13:49:07Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractIn many large cities worldwide, private companies operate public transport systems under concession contracts granted by the local governments. The performance of these concessions, including the quality of service and amount of subsidy, is often an issue of public debate. In this context, a major factor that determines performance is the concession contract. Payment mechanisms (established in the contract) influence the operator's decisions by providing certain incentives. Therefore, it is important to study the effects of the payment mechanism on the performance of the transport system.
dc.description.abstractIn this study, we examine payment schemes that are linear in the frequency of transport services and number of passengers transported; moreover we compare the impact on operators' decisions by incorporating a contract design analysis in the micmeconomic modelling. These effects are analysed in terms of operational variables and social welfare, including benefits for reducing externalities. To conduct this analysis, we formulate a microeconomic model and perform numerical simulations. The results show that the payment made per frequency plays an important role in the operator's decision making, that is, the regulator can use this payment as an incentive to modify the service decisions and achieve maximum social welfare. The model also indicates that the per-passenger payment system is an incentive to transport passengers, but after reaching a certain value its increase does not influence the operation of the service. These results may contribute to the discussion on how to design contracts to provide certain incentives.
dc.description.funderCentre for Sustainable Urban Development (CEDEUS)
dc.description.funderBus Rapid Transit+ (BRT+) Centre of Excellence - Volvo Research and Educational Foundations (VREF)
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital11-04-2024
dc.format.extent9 páginas
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.tranpol.2020.04.016
dc.identifier.eissn1879-310X
dc.identifier.issn0967-070X
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2020.04.016
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/79424
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000538150100003
dc.information.autorucIngeniería;Galilea Aranda Patricia Vivian;S/I;1365
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido parcial
dc.pagina.final35
dc.pagina.inicio27
dc.publisherELSEVIER SCI LTD
dc.revistaTRANSPORT POLICY
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectContracts
dc.subjectPublic transport
dc.subjectConcessions
dc.subjectBus operators
dc.subjectIncentives
dc.subjectEconomic modelling
dc.subjectASSESSING STANDARD COSTS
dc.subjectBUS SERVICE
dc.subjectREGULATORY CONTRACTS
dc.subjectQUALITY CONTRACTS
dc.subjectEFFICIENCY
dc.subjectOPTIMIZATION
dc.subjectSUBSIDIZATION
dc.subjectDESIGN
dc.subjectROAD
dc.subject.ods11 Sustainable Cities and Communities
dc.subject.odspa11 Ciudades y comunidades sostenibles
dc.titleHow do different payment schemes to operators affect public transport concessions? A microeconomic model
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen93
sipa.codpersvinculados1365
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.indexScopus
sipa.trazabilidadCarga SIPA;09-01-2024
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