Scientific realism, or the risks of importing research models into psychology
Abstract
In "Scientific Realism and the Issue of Variability in Behavior," Arocha (2021) develops an acute critique of "the standard model of current research practice in psychology" (p. 376), sharply dissecting five unwarranted assumptions behind it. To address these issues, the author proposes adopting a nonpositivist philosophical basis for behavioral research: scientific realism. Behind this argumentation, however, it is implied that scientific realism is fit for becoming the metatheoretical framework for psychology because it addresses the shortcomings of the current positivist model. In this commentary, I argue that scientific realism is not fit for becoming that philosophical basis, because it is open to reducing the discipline's subject matter-the human person-to make it fit with models that have been fruitful in other sciences. Three historical examples are presented to show the risks of adopting models from disciplines devoted to explaining other phenomena to tackle the complexity of psychology's subject matter.
Description
Keywords
mechanization, positivism, psychology's subject matter, scientific models, scientific realism