Scientific realism, or the risks of importing research models into psychology

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dc.contributor.authorCarre, David
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T22:17:21Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T22:17:21Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.abstractIn "Scientific Realism and the Issue of Variability in Behavior," Arocha (2021) develops an acute critique of "the standard model of current research practice in psychology" (p. 376), sharply dissecting five unwarranted assumptions behind it. To address these issues, the author proposes adopting a nonpositivist philosophical basis for behavioral research: scientific realism. Behind this argumentation, however, it is implied that scientific realism is fit for becoming the metatheoretical framework for psychology because it addresses the shortcomings of the current positivist model. In this commentary, I argue that scientific realism is not fit for becoming that philosophical basis, because it is open to reducing the discipline's subject matter-the human person-to make it fit with models that have been fruitful in other sciences. Three historical examples are presented to show the risks of adopting models from disciplines devoted to explaining other phenomena to tackle the complexity of psychology's subject matter.
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/09593543211006777
dc.identifier.eissn1461-7447
dc.identifier.issn0959-3543
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1177/09593543211006777
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/94546
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000661942600010
dc.issue.numero3
dc.language.isoen
dc.pagina.final432
dc.pagina.inicio429
dc.revistaTheory & psychology
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectmechanization
dc.subjectpositivism
dc.subjectpsychology's subject matter
dc.subjectscientific models
dc.subjectscientific realism
dc.titleScientific realism, or the risks of importing research models into psychology
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen31
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2025-01-12
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